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There are several different strands in the current economic literature regarding 
the role of IMF. In this Chapter, I develop one particular theme, namely the 
role of the IMF in assisting countries that have serious international payments 
difficulties. One characterisation of this debate is that between the ‘moral 
hazard’ school and the ‘liquidity’ school. The former stresses the classic 
perverse incentive problem created with insurance-type interventions in 
capital markets leading lenders to bet on being ‘bailed out’ at some future date 
if things go wrong - especially in countries that might be considered ‘too big 
to fail’. 
 
Adherents to this school point to the sheer size of recent IMF led packages to 
emerging economies, the very low emerging market spreads after the 
assistance to Mexico in 1995 and the ‘lending boom’ to emerging economies, 
including the Asian economies, that then followed as evidence of the potential 
importance of moral hazard. In Figure 1, we plot the EMBI (define this- see 
footnote 2) spread from 1994 as illustration
2. 
 
(Figure 1 about here, EMBI) 
 
Some have labelled this as a theory of plenty: a theory of too much private 
lending, on the one hand, and too little discipline on the other. This lack of 
discipline might result in countries contracting large amounts of debt (either in 
the public or private sectors or in the private sector with implicit or explicit 
guarantees) while, at the same time, failing to address structural weaknesses or 
not adjusting quickly enough to negative shocks as they arise.  
 
According to this school of thought, the role of the IMF must then be very 
limited. Lending instruments and IMF programmes should be designed to 
reduce ‘moral hazard’ as far as possible.  The emphasis is then on how to 
resolve cases of countries with payments difficulties with minimum official 
involvement and higher degrees of private sector involvement (PSI).  A 
payment difficulty is essentially a problem between a country and its private 
creditors. 
 
                                                                 
2 The EMBI is JP Morgan’s “Emerging Market Bond Index “.   2
The second school stresses failures in international capital markets. In 
particular, adherents point to asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers and co-ordination failures between lenders giving rise to potential 
problems of multiple equilibria.  According to this school, financial markets 
may be subject to inherent instability and consequent ‘runs’ which may prove 
extremely costly for the countries concerned. Such theories might be labelled 
‘too much instability’. Evidence includes lending booms and subsequent 
‘sudden stops’ in capital flows (as non-residents attempt to ‘run’ and residents 
attempt to place funds abroad), the volatility of emerging economy risk 
spreads and the apparent frequency of recent financial crises. 
 
Proponents of this view tend to believe that while countries that suffer ‘runs’ 
may have  structural weaknesses that make them more vulnerable to “attack”, 
nevertheless there is a tendency that the  ‘punishment’ is worse than the 
‘crime’ and hence there is an ‘overshooting’ of relative prices and stocks 
causing grave damage to the countries that are ‘hit’ and disrupting 
international markets more generally through ‘contagion’. Further evidence in 
favour of this view is the high (unexplained) correlation between emerging 
country bond spreads. 
 
In this view of the world, the role of the IMF is to attempt to stabilise capital 
markets and to make them work more smoothly. The IMF should, according 
to adherents of this view act essentially as a provider of liquidity. Indeed, 
simply the credible promise of liquidity should eliminate the desire of 
investors to ‘run’. The IMF may also act to co-ordinate lenders, at minimum 
providing a focal point for expectations, and hence potentially affecting 
equilibrium selection. More directly, both through its informal powers of 
persuasion and more formal conditionality, the IMF may also affect the 
perceptions of atomistic investors and also reduce problems of lack of 
discipline as stressed by the moral hazard school.  The IMF may also act, as 
an ‘honest broker’ attempting to ameliorate problems of information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders which again, it might be argued, 
lead to unstable outcomes. 
 
These appear to be quite opposite views of the world and hence somewhat 
difficult to reconcile. However, I will argue that both schools are right, and 
moreover, that they may be right simultaneously.  In particular, I build on 
previous work and develop a very simple game theoretic model that 
encompasses both views of the world.  I show that depending on particular 
assumptions, the world may indeed be characterised by both views   3
simultaneously.  Indeed, I suggest that it is precisely because both schools are 
right simultaneously that makes the task of the IMF so difficult and, 
unfortunately, potentially without a clear normative solution. 
 
Different waves of thought flowing through the IMF, and through its political 
masters, often prompted by events, may of course lead to particular policy 
approaches being adopted and outcomes generated. Unfortunately, such 
perceived changes in policy direction may only serve to increase the inherent 
instability of international capital markets. Hence, if this essay does have a 
normative message it is an appeal for distance from dogmatic discussions of 
either one view or the other and a call for  revision of the international 
financial architecture built on the  recognition that both views have validity. 
 
Given this reality, more creative thinking may be required to find a better way 
to manage these problems including, for example, the need to consider 
changes in institutional structures.  I use the results of the modelling exercise 
to comment on some of the recent debates regarding reform of the 
'international financial architecture'.  In particular, I consider the role of 
collective action clauses in bond contracts and the recent (or revived) 
proposals for a bankruptcy procedure for countries. The model yields 
interesting and new interpretations for these proposals. 
 
It is likely, however, that particular events will continue to shape policy 
changes in the months and years to come. At the time of writing the first draft 
of this paper, Argentina was attempting to restructure, in an orderly fashion, 
its foreign held public sector debt to avoid explicit default. This attempt failed 
– or never really got off the ground.  At the end of 2000 a large IMF support 
package was agreed but subsequently Argentina backtracked on a proposal to 
cut politically sensitive public expenditure, adopted more heterodox economic 
policies to the displeasure of the IMF and country risk soared to over 1000 
basis points.  It is argued that at that point the IMF had a decision to make in 
that, either it had to support Argentina strongly or withdraw. In fact,  it did 
neither -  the perception was one of vacillation. The model presented in this 
Chapter provides an explanation as to why first Argentina deviated to a more 
risky strategy and secondly why the IMF vacillated, being caught between the 
discomfort at continuing support to a country adopting more risky strategies 
(that subsequently made the default more painful) and the knowledge that 
withdrawal would no doubt have prompted a private sector run and the default 
that Argentina was trying to avoid. 
   4
The IMF did finally withdraw support and the feared private sector run did 
indeed take place.  The banking and exchange controls, put in place as a 
consequence of the run, were an important element in bringing down the de la 
Rúa government at the end of 2001. At the time of writing this second draft, 
Argentina has devalued and defaulted.  Formal negotiations between 
Argentina and her foreign private creditors have yet to begin and indeed I 
argue below that a game is continuing. On the one hand, the IMF and world 
leaders, concerned that new money might simply put off needed reforms and 
new promises might not be kept, have called for a ‘sustainable solution’ from 
Buenos Aires. On the other hand, President Duhalde has suggested that a 
sustainable solution may not be possible without international support. This is 
not the place to discuss solutions to the Argentine crisis.  Suffice to say that 
the Argentine authorities are caught between the negative political and 
economic effects of the banking controls, and the fear that lifting these 
controls without an agreement with the IMF might provoke a ‘run’ on the 
currency and worsened monetary instability. The exchange rate dived to 
around 4 pesos to one dollar (from 1 to 1 in January) as the private sector 
found ways to ‘run’ to dollars despite the controls in place. The exchange rate 
subsequently recovered but, at the time of writing, is now around 3.7 pesos to 
the dollar, with banking controls and a more explicit Central Bank 
intervention policy still in place.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, I review briefly some recent 
strands of the more theoretical debate regarding the role of the IMF. In section 
3, I develop a simple model of the interaction between the IMF a country and 
the private capital markets. In section 4 I relate the results of this modelling 
exercise to the current debate regarding reforming the international financial 
architecture. In section 5 I use these antecedents to then focus on the case of 
Argentina and the difficult role of the IMF as the country's situation became 
more fragile.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The role of the IMF: selected themes in the current academic debate 
 
A set of interesting recent papers proposes different roles for the IMF in 
models of sovereign lending.  The three potential roles reviewed here are the 
IMF as ‘auditor’ versus the IMF as ‘enforcer’ versus the IMF as a ‘fund’, a 
potential provider of money or the promise of money. 
 
Dooley and Verma (2000) focus on the potential role of the IMF as a type of 
contract enforcer.  In their model, in the event of default, the IMF enters with   5
an exogenous probability and enforces a sharing of future country output 
between borrowers and lenders.  In the absence of the IMF, there is a costly 
renegotiation process and hence the role of the IMF is to reduce the 
probability of a large sunk cost that would be implied by costly renegotiation. 
 
It is interesting to note that in this model there is an optimal value of the 
probability of IMF intervention between zero and one. In other words, it 
appears to be optimal for the IMF to intervene unpredictably. In a further 
extension to the model, the authors claim that in a world where contracts are 
supported by reputation and not “gunboat” diplomacy, then the role of the 
IMF as the “enforcer” of contracts may be redundant. 
 
A second approach considers the IMF not as an enforcer of contracts but as an 
auditor. This is the focus of a recent paper by Gay, Hayes and Shin (2000). In 
this paper, there is a trade-off whereby, as IMF intervention improves 
information and hence reduces the probability that borrowers are faced with 
large renegotiation costs, ex ante lenders are less willing to lend.  This trade-
off is referred to by the authors as the,  “whistleblower” versus the “fireman” 
role of the IMF. In their set-up, the IMF is generally bad for lenders as the 
“fireman” reduces the ex post cost of resolution and hence reduces the stock of 
debt that can be supported in equilibrium - following Dooley 2000 - and this 
unambiguously reduces lenders’ welfare. However, for borrowers the IMF 
may imply a net benefit as improving the information available to lenders 
reduces the inefficiency of the information asymmetry and this can outweigh 
the costs of the lower level of debt. 
 
Gay, Hayes and Shin (2000) also consider an IMF that acts unpredictably 
(which they refer to as "case by case") but in their set-up conclude that this 
will make lenders better off and may make borrowers worse-off relative to the 
regime where the IMF follows a specific policy rule. It is in effect an 
intermediate model between a version with no IMF and the full IMF model. 
This contrasts with the Dooley and Verma result where an unpredictable IMF 
as enforcer may actually be the optimal policy. Of course the IMF is doing 
different things in the two cases so perhaps this difference is not too 
surprising. 
 
The IMF clearly has other roles too apart from that of “enforcer” or “auditor.” 
Specifically the IMF also provides money or promises of money. This role can 
protect borrowers against co-ordination problems between lenders. If the IMF 
offers stand by arrangements then this may prevent costly self-fulfilling type   6
runs.  This is the approach taken by Gavin and Powell (1999).  However, the 
price for such liquidity protection may be moral hazard thus allowing 
borrowers or lenders to take greater risks actually making ‘fundamental” type 
runs more likely. Gavin and Powell (1999) argue that private sector stand-bys 
(contingent facilities) might also provide countries with the same type of 
liquidity protection and that if these are correctly priced (i.e.: assuming that 
there are no information problems), then these may serve to restrict moral 
hazard. 
 
In what follows I present a very simple model where the IMF only plays a role 
of providing money or the promise of money - following previous work by 
Gavin and Powell (1999). It also turns out, in this very simple approach that 
the IMF may end up playing unpredictably, which following Gay, Hayes and 
Shin (2000) may also be thought of as a 'case by case' strategy or its close 
cousin - the 'Constructive Ambiguity' doctrine of central banks – see also 
Fischer (2000). 
 
3. A Simple Model 
 
In this section, I describe a very simple model to fix ideas.  The model can be 
thought of as a three player game where the actors are 1) the country, 2) the 
IMF and 3) private sector lenders. In what follows we consider different 
temporal structures of the game. Let us suppose for simplicity that we restrict 
the potential actions of each to a bivariate decision. In particular that the 
country must decide a Safe or a Risky strategy, the IMF must decide whether 
to Assist or Not Assist and the private sector must decide whether to Lend or 
to Run. 
 
3.a A game with the IMF, a Country and Private Investors 
 
This game with three players, each with two possible actions, has eight 
potential outcomes. We represent the game in extensive form in Figure 2. 
However, in what follows we restrict the outcomes in a way that depends on 
some other features. Let us assume that there is a simultaneous game between 
the IMF and the country and that then the private sector conditions its 
decisions on the outcome of that game and in particular, on what the IMF 
does. This inter-temporal structure can be justified in at least two different 
ways. First, the private sector is making decisions every second in real time, 
whereas, IMF and country policy discussions have more of a defined structure 
and timetable.  Second, the private sector is composed of many different   7
actors and may be thought of as incapable (or less capable) of making any 
commitment. Hence, its actions must be conditioned on the actions of others. 
However, as we discuss below, one interpretation of the current debate is 
precisely to attempt to change the inter-temporal structure of this game. We 
therefore explore different sequential structures below. It should come as no 
great surprise that the results are highly sensitive to the particular assumed 
inter-temporal structure. 
 
Furthermore, we assume that the private sector’s actions crucially depend on 
those of the IMF’s. In particular, we assume that the private sector Runs 
unless the IMF Assists. This may seem a harsh assumption but, it makes little 
difference if instead we say that there is a greater probability of the private 
sector running without IMF assistance so long as that greater probability 
results in expected payoffs that satisfy certain conditions which we outline 
below. Hence, while this particular assumption is harsh, weaker assumptions 
along the same lines would similar results and it does reflect reality in a way 
that the IMF, and the country, must take into account. We discuss this more 
extensively below and also relate the assumption to the case of Argentina. 
 
At least two more theoretical interpretations for this assumption are available. 
First, as discussed above the private sector has a severe co-ordination problem 
and hence may Run unless the IMF ‘co-ordinates’ in some fashion or by 
Assisting the IMF directly rules out a ‘Run’ equilibrium through its promise of 
liquidity. A second interpretation is that there is some (un-modelled) 
information problem and the private sector only trusts the country (and the 
IMF), if the IMF puts down its own money rather than simply indulges in 
‘cheap talk’ without committing resources. The assumption, that the private 
sector ‘Runs’, without IMF assistance is how the ‘liquidity’ school argument 
is introduced into this version of the model. With this assumption there are 
then only four relevant outcomes (as in the standard prisoner’s dilemma), as 
the private sector’s action is determined by the actions of the IMF. 
 
As there are only four outcomes that depend on the actions of the country and 
the IMF, we can also represent the model in a two by two matrix as in Figure 
3. We label the four potential outcomes: 1. First Best, 2. On Your Own, 3. 
Moral Hazard and 4. Worst Case.  These labels refer to some general notion of 
world welfare and not the payoffs of particular players. The First Best is a 
case where the country plays Safe, the IMF Assists and the private sector 
Lends.  The Worst Case is when the country plays Risky, the IMF does Not 
Assist and the private sector Runs. A third outcome is where the country plays   8
Safe, the IMF does not Assist and the private sector Runs which we label as 
‘On Your Own’.  It might also be referred to as the case where the discipline 
of the IMF and the private sector is most fully operating. The final outcome is 
that where the country plays Risky, the IMF Assists and the private sector 
Lends. This, we refer to as the Moral Hazard case. 
 
  Discussion of the payoffs 
 
The equilibrium of this game naturally depends on the assumed payoffs. As 
the actions of the private sector are assumed to follow those of the IMF, it is 
only the payoffs of the IMF and the country that matter.  Assume that the base 
case is the First Best and the payoffs, both for the country and IMF, are zero. 
We will write the payoffs as a vector with the first element, the payoff to the 
country and the second, the payoff to the IMF.  Hence the payoffs are 
{Country, IMF}={0,0} in this case. 
 
In order for there to be a moral hazard problem it must be the case that, given 
the IMF is Assisting, the country will prefer not to play Safe but would rather 
play Risky. We assume then, following the ‘moral hazard school’ that in the 
Moral Hazard outcome the payoffs are {C, -D} with C, D >0 where we 
assume that the country is better off and the IMF is worse off relative to the 
base case. 
 
In the ‘Worst Case’, the country plays Risky, the IMF does Not Assist and the 
private sector Runs.  Here we assume the payoffs are {-E,-F} where E,F>0.  
We assume that -D<-F or in other words, for the IMF, the Moral Hazard 
outcome is worse than the ‘worst case’ outcome.  One interpretation of recent 
lobbying of the ‘moral hazard’ school economists is precisely to ensure that 
this is the case.  We discuss this particular issue further in the next section as 
we note that recent authors have suggested otherwise - see Eichengreen and 
Ruhl (2000).. For the country however the Worst Case outcome is the worst of 
all i.e.: -E is the lowest payoff the country may receive.   
 
Finally, in the On Your Own outcome the payoffs are {-A,-B} (A,B>0) and 
we assume that –E<-A .  In other words, for the country, while this outcome is 
clearly worse than the First Best , if the IMF is not Assisting, On Your Own is 
preferred to the Worst Case. Hence, if the IMF does Not Assist, it is then 
better for the country to play Safe and not Risky. This clearly makes sense 
thinking about lender Moral Hazard or in other words that the risky strategy is 
that the country is contracting too much debt at too low an interest rate as   9
lenders believe that there is a high probability of them being ‘bailed out’. We 
also assume that the payoff to the IMF here is –B where B>0.  This implies 
that if the country is playing Safe, then the IMF would prefer to Assist than to 
Not Assist. 
 
   Discussion of Potential Equilibria 
 
If the country and the IMF are acting simultaneously, with the payoffs as 
defined above, it is simple to see that this game has no Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies.  In particular, start from the First Best. If the IMF is Assisting, 
the country then prefers to play Risky so the country prefers the Moral Hazard 
solution to the First Best. But if the country is playing Risky then the IMF 
prefers to Not Assist and hence prefers the Worst Case to Moral Hazard. 
However, if the IMF is Not Assisting and the private sector Runs, then the 
country prefers to play Safe (i.e.: the country prefers On Your Own to the 
Worst Case) but then if the country is playing Safe, the IMF should Assist and 
we are back to the First Best. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies. 
 
However, it is well known, that in such a situation there is, at least one, 
equilibrium in mixed strategies where the IMF plays randomly between Assist 
and Not Assist and where the country plays randomly between Safe and 
Risky. In particular, suppose that the probability that the IMF plays Assist is p 
and the probability that the country plays Safe is q. It follows that, given the 
payoffs there is a particular pair of probabilities, p and q, that make the 
Country indifferent between playing Safe and playing Risky and that make the 
IMF indifferent between Assisting and not Assisting respectively. This 
probability pair then defines the mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
 
To find the probability, p, that the IMF Assists in this equilibrium, consider 
the position of the country. To ensure that the country is indifferent between 
playing Safe and Risky, it must be the case that the expected payoff to the 
country from playing Safe, calculated using the probabilities of the IMF 
playing Assist or not, is equal to the expected payoff to the country of playing 
Safe, again weighted by the probabilities of the IMF Assisting or Not 
Assisting. In mathematical terms: 
 
) )( 1 ( ) )( 1 ( 0 E p pC A p p ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
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It then follows by rearranging this equation that: 
 
The existence of ‘moral hazard’ is critical in the explanation of why there is 
no equilibrium in pure strategies and only in mixed strategies. If there were no 
‘moral hazard’ then C would not be positive but would be zero or negative (C 
is the payoff to the Country if it plays Risky given the IMF Assists). If there 
was no moral hazard present, then the probability p would be unity (or would 
not be well-defined as it would be greater than one) and, if the other payoffs 
remained unchanged, then the Best Case would then be a pure-strategy 
equilibrium. 
 
In similar vein, the probability that the country plays Safe, q, can also be 
found by considering the position of the IMF. The IMF will be indifferent to 
Assisting and or not Assisting if its expected payoff from playing Assist is 
equal to the expected payoff of Not Assisting:  i.e.: if: 
 
) )( 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( 0 F q B q D q q ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
Rearranging this equation we find that: 
 
 
It is easy to check from our assumptions regarding payoffs above that 0<p<1 
and 0<q<1. 
 
There are various interpretations of this mixed strategy equilibrium. First, the 
IMF and G7 have consistently stated their preference for a ‘case by case’ 
approach to countries with international payments’ difficulties and that has 
indeed been the norm in practice. There is a close analogy here between the 
‘case by case’ approach applied to countries and the apparent affinity for 
‘Constructive Ambiguity’ of central banks when it comes to helping banks in 
distress. 
 
There are at least two interpretations of the reasons why ‘case by case’ or 












?  11 
complex to write down the right set of rules and hence flexibility is required to 
deal with particular cases as they arise. This might be referred to as the 
‘incomplete contracts’ view. However, the other interpretation is that ‘case by 
case’ or ‘Constructive Ambiguity’ really implies unpredictability. As we show 
in the game above, if there is ‘moral hazard’, and other conditions are met, 
then unpredictability may be necessary for there to be an equilibrium. Under 
this interpretation, to ensure an equilibrium the IMF must never Assist with 
certainty, and the country will respond by never being absolutely clear that it 
will play Safe in order for each to be content given the strategy of the other
3. 
 
A second interpretation of mixed play is that players actually chose a pure 
strategy but there is some uncertainty about what the other player will do.  
That is to say, as Binmore (1992) puts it, “each player chooses, as though their 
opponents were playing mixed strategies. Insofar as any mixing occurs it 
happens within players’ heads"
4.  A third interpretation is that, while the 
equilibrium is in mixed strategies, players may take time to get there. Players 
will note changes in opponents’ actions over time, which may of course 
depend on the changes in each other player’s actions, and attempt to infer if 
players are then playing in pure or mixed strategies and assess the relevant 
probabilities. Over time, if the mixed strategy equilibrium is stable, then there 
will be a convergence to the probabilities in that equilibrium but the outcomes 
observed will reflect this convergence process. Loosely speaking, players 
might then be thought of as playing a set of ‘disequilibrium’ pure strategies 
that, over time, converge to the mixed strategy equilibrium
5. 
 
I remain agnostic as to the particular interpretation of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium. However, the important point is that given the payoffs, the mixed 
strategy equilibrium is the only Nash equilibrium to this game. 
 
It is interesting to note that the probability that the country plays Safe depends 
on the relationship between (D-F) and B: the payoffs to the IMF. If (D-F) is 
                                                                 
3 In Gavin and Powell (1999), we developed a slightly more complex model with imperfect information 
where the IMF prefers a mixed strategy equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where the IMF 
always Assists in the case of a systemic problem and never Assists in the case of an individual problem giving 
a slightly different interpretation of the Constructive Ambiguity doctrine.  See Fischer (2001) for a further 
discussion of the analogy between ‘case by case’ and the ‘constructive ambiguity’ doctrine of central banks 
and the interpretation that such approaches are in part designed to control ‘moral hazard’. 
4 This is known as ‘purification’ of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium – see Binmore (1992), p519. 
5 Binmore (1992) illustrates this possibility with an example where players are fully rational but myopic.  In 
his words, “Players always choose a pure strategy that maximises expected payoffs given their beliefs.  But 
their beliefs change as they observe their opponent’s play. In the long run, their beliefs converge on the Nash 
equilibrium of the game”.  See Binmore (1992), pp404-408.   12 
large, relative to B, then the probability that the country will play Safe, in this 
mixed strategy equilibrium, increases. This means that if the Moral Hazard 
outcome is very bad for the IMF compared to the Worst Case outcome (this is 
summarised by the difference, D-F), then the probability that the country plays 
Safe rises in equilibrium. On the other hand if (D-F) is reduced, then the 
probability that the country plays Safe diminishes. 
 
The welfare of the country in the mixed strategy equilibrium is equal to (1-
p)(-A) or -AC/(E-A+C)
 6. This is increasing in E but decreasing in A and C. 
This implies that, for example, increasing E (i.e.: making –E more negative, 
making the Risky strategy combined with non-assistance from the IMF more 
painful for the country), would actually increase country welfare in the 
equilibrium – as the IMF would have to Assist more frequently for an 
equilibrium to be found. This is somewhat analogous to the result that 
increasing the pain of a country in default might actually make a country 
better off, ex ante, as it would support greater private lending, although the 
mechanism for this result here is quite different. 
 
While the equilibrium of this game is in mixed strategies, ex post after the 
dice are rolled, particular outcomes will be observed.  These outcomes may 
result in a higher or a lower welfare for each player ex post compared to the ex 
ante welfare of the mixed strategy equilibrium.  In particular, if the IMF 
Assists the welfare of the country is either C or zero depending if the country 
ends up playing Risky or Safe respectively.  These welfare levels are clearly 
higher than (1-p)(-A), the ex ante welfare level of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium while if the IMF does Not Assist the country's welfare levels are 
lower (either -A or worst of all -E). 
 
As noted in the introduction, a common argument is that after the Mexican 
‘bailout’, international capital markets were affected by severe moral hazard. 
Some have even gone as far as to blame the Asian crisis on such moral hazard 
and hence the very low risk spreads post-Tequila in 1996/97
7. More recently, 
there has been a focus on attempting to limit this moral hazard and hence 
greater pressure to restrict IMF action.  
 
                                                                 
6 Note that in the Nash, mixed strategy equilibrium, the country is indifferent to playing Safe or Risky by 
definition and so the payoff to the country can be calculated as simply the payoff to playing Safe. 
7 Mussa (this volume) also suggests that the IMF was not tough enough on Argentina during the 'good times' 
of 1996/7 and some might even go as far as to blame the Argentine crisis on 'moral hazard' too.  After all, if 
Argentina's fiscal policy was characterised by a chronic lack of fiscal responsibility, as Mussa suggests, then 
lender 'moral hazard' must be one candidate explanation for the low risk spreads at that time.   13 
This story can be rationalised easily within the context of the simple model 
above. After Mexico, it might be hypothesised that the dice were rolled and 
the ‘moral hazard’ outcome observed. This outcome then consisted of 
countries adopting a more Risky strategy, the IMF Assisting through large 
packages and the private sector Lending.  Subsequently, one interpretation 
might be that various lobbying activities by, moral hazard school economists 
have attempted to increase D-F or in other words that the IMF has a lower 
relative payoff to the Moral Hazard outcome versus Not Assisting if the 
country plays Risky. These lobbying activities may then be rationalised as 
attempts to increase the probability that countries play Safe. From the above it 
follows that if D-F is raised then this increases q, the probability that the 
country plays Safe in the Nash equilibrium.
8 
 
An additional step to the game might be added where the private sector ex 
ante (i.e.: before the game analysed above has started) offers a standard debt 
contract to the country. The ‘fair’ interest rate on this contract (say fixed such 
that expected returns to the private sector ex ante are zero or the same as some 
opportunity cost of funds), will reflect the potential outcomes of the mixed 
strategy equilibrium weighted by their respective probabilities. Given that in 
the mixed strategy equilibrium there is a positive probability (namely p (1-q)) 
of the Moral Hazard outcome, the ex ante ‘risk spread’ will then reflect to 
some extent, ‘lender moral hazard’. Ex post, the private sector will win or lose 
relative to this ‘fair interest rate’ depending on the observed outcome of the 
roll of the dice and which particular outcome is observed
9.  Private Sector 
Involvement, in its broad sense, might then be defined as any outcome where 
the private sector loses according to this measure. 
 
3b: Repeating the game: the opportunities for cooperation 
 
Let us now consider what might happen assuming the above one-shot game is 
repeated. In the one shot game, the only equilibrium was one in mixed 
strategies. As discussed above, if the IMF offers Assist the country would 
prefer to play Risky but if the country plays Risky the IMF would prefer to 
                                                                 
8 Naturally the actual outcome of the game here is random and is in some sense then less interesting.  The 
story relates to how the probabilities in that equilibrium might change as the payoffs change.  It is also 
important whether the outcomes are random ones from some probability distribution or whether they are 
changing pure strategy equilibria.  Binmore (1992) defines a kibitzer as someone who watches a game but 
does not play, but by some rule of nature, is always more expert than the actual players themselves.  He then 
goes on to note how kibitzers may interpret different games.  A kibitzer, who observes a game where players 
are playing randomly may of course think that he is observing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when in fact 
he is observing just one potential outcome of mixed strategy play (see footnote 5, p397). 
9 I am indebted to Chris Gilbert, David Vines and Leandro Arozamena for pointing this out.   14 
play Safe but in that case the IMF would prefer to Assist.  As it was assumed 
that the country could not commit to play Safe if the IMF offered Assist 
(moral hazard), then the First Best was not an equilibrium and given the 
assumed structure of payoffs there was indeed no pure strategy equilibrium 
available. 
 
However, in a repeated version of this game there may be an opportunity for 
co-operation developing between the IMF and the country. Note that the best 
outcome for the IMF is the First Best. Suppose that the IMF offers the First 
Best but with the threat that if the country deviates (and plays Risky to obtain 
the Moral Hazard outcome), then the IMF will respond with the Nash (mixed 
strategy) equilibrium forever. As we had before, the payoff to the country in 
the Nash equilibrium is equal to (1-p)(-A) and the country is then clearly 
worse off than that in the First Best, which is equal to zero. It is possible then, 
that the First Best can be attained through this approach
10. 
 
In this example, the country must weigh up the welfare of staying in the First 
Best forever, which is equal to zero, versus the alternative of deviating and 
obtaining the payoff, C, from the Moral Hazard outcome for one period and 
then the welfare of the mixed strategy equilibrium for the rest of time. The 
First Best can then be supported if: 
 









Where ? is the discount factor of the country and hence the second term on the 
left hand side gives the payoff to playing the Nash equilibrium forever, 
discounted by one period.  Substituting for p in terms of the payoffs and 
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10 As is well known this is only one potential ‘cooperative’ outcome of many. The IMF might, for example, 
use On Your Own forever as the threatened trigger punishment strategy where the IMF does not Assist and 
the Country prefers to play Safe. On Your Own in this game is the country’s security level (or Max-Min) in 
the sense that it gives the best payoff for the country assuming that the IMF will always choose the worst 
action for the country given the country’s choice. There is no claim to uniqueness here.  Another issue is 
whether the assumed trigger strategies are non-renegotiable.  We do not discuss these issues further here and 
leave the analysis of a proven non-renegotiable punishment strategy for future research – see Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986).    15 
 
By our original assumptions A, C, E >0 so we know that this gives a threshold 
discount factor of less than one
11.  The larger is C (the payoff from deviating 
and obtaining the Moral Hazard outcome for one period), then the higher is 
the threshold discount factor or in other words, if C is large then the country 
must weight future payoffs more highly for the First Best to be supported. 
This is because increasing C increases the reward from deviation. The 
threshold discount factor also rises if E is increased. If the country’s pain from 
playing Risky and the IMF not Assisting is greater, then as the welfare in the 
Nash equilibrium rises, the discount factor now has to be greater to support the 
First Best. 
 
Suppose that default only occurs when the country plays Risky and the IMF 
does Not Assist
12, where the payoff to the country is equal to -E such that in 
fact -E = yG - (1-y)H where (1-y) is the probability of default (0<y<1) and H 
(H>E>A) is the cost of default
13.  Perhaps, somewhat surprisingly then, if 
default is made less costly, (H is reduced such that -H is less negative), then 
the First Best has more chance of being supported in the sense that the 
threshold discount factor increases
14.  This simple model then provides some 
interesting results which we follow-up on below in a discussion on the reform 
of the international financial architecture. 
 
However, it also raises some difficult questions. Suppose the probability of 
avoiding default in the case of Risky play and not obtaining IMF assistance, y, 
is a stochastic variable with some persistence over time and that even if the 
IMF and the country are in the First Best the value of this probability and its 
stochastic process are known.  For example, it is likely that y will be highly 
                                                                 
11 We note that if C+E>A, then the threshold discount factor is greater than zero too, although there is no 
obvious reason why that is the case. If then C or E are sufficiently small or A sufficiently large (subject to the 
restrictions to obtain the unique Nash mixed strategy equilibrium), any positive discount factor would support 
the First Best. 
12 In other words if the country plays Safe we assume that the technology is such that the country is protected 
from insolvency and if the IMF Assists but the country plays Risky (the moral hazard outcome) then we 
assume that the IMF bails out the country if there are insufficient resources (or unwillingness) to pay private 
creditors. 
13 This may be motivated by saying that there is a probability y of a good outcome from the Risky strategy in 
which case the payoff is +G and a probability of (1-y) of a bad outcome, in which case the country defaults, 
and the cost of default is then represented by -H.  This structure may be motivated either within an 'ability to 
pay' or a 'willingness to pay' type model of default.  In the latter case, given the bad outcome (and the lack of 
IMF Assistance), it would be in the best interest of the country to default rather than, say, pursue some very 
costly adjustment. 
14 We have to be careful here as if the cost of default is reduced such that -E>-A, then the nature of the 
equilibrium changes and indeed, all else remaining the same, the Worst Case becomes a pure strategy 
equilibrium. This possibility becomes important in section 4.   16 
correlated to country fundamentals such as growth or the country terms of 
trade. Substituting in for y and rearranging the equation for the threshold value 
of the discount factor, above, this can be re-expressed as a threshold value for 
1-y, the probability of default in the case of Risky play and no IMF 
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As H>E>A, it follows that  C A H ? ? ? ? 1 and hence this gives a threshold 
value for 1-y which is less than one.  As long as numerator is positive it is also 
greater than zero (this might be thought of as a limit on how large C can be in 
relation to G and A to control the incentives to deviate).  Now, if the 
probability of default in the case of Risky/No Assist, (1-y), rises to a level 
exceeding this threshold then the country will deviate to the Risky strategy.  
The intuition behind this is that as the probability of default in the Risky/No 
Assist outcome rises, and hence the payoff for the country in that outcome is 
made worse, the probability that the IMF will Assist in the mixed strategy 
equilibrium must rise (for there to be an equilibrium which makes the country 
indifferent between Safe and Risky). This then means that the ex ante welfare 
of the mixed strategy equilibrium for the country increases and hence the First 
Best has less chance of being supported.  To put it another way, as country 
fundamentals suffer, the country can expect a greater probability of IMF 
Assistance in the non-cooperative mixed strategy equilibrium and hence the 
incentives to cooperate to achieve the cooperative First Best are eroded. 
 
Now consider the case of a country with deteriorating fundamentals sinking 
deeper towards payments’ problems. As the threshold value of (1-y) is less 
than one, it is very likely that at some point before default this value will be 
breached and the country will deviate to the Risky strategy.  To put it simply, 
before a country defaults, it is likely that it will deviate.  One characterisation 
of this result is that it supports the idea that countries will 'gamble for 
resurrection' before they actually default. 
 
This raises some interesting issues. Consider the position of the IMF. Faced 
with the possibility of deviation to a risky strategy before default is called, an   17 
interesting question is whether the IMF should not attempt to anticipate this 
set of events? 
 
The difficult issue is then at what point should the IMF then itself decide to 
switch to the mixed strategy equilibrium? If y follows some stochastic process 
over time related to country fundamentals and the IMF today knows the 
conditional distribution of y before each one-shot game is played, should the 
IMF play with the mixed strategy equilibrium if the expected value of (1-y) 
next period, conditional on information at time t, is above the threshold level? 
Or perhaps the IMF should take a "Value at Risk" approach with a rule that it 
should withdraw support if there is a probability greater than X%, that (1-y) 
will pass the threshold next period and that the country will deviate?.  
 
However, if the country knows the rule by which the IMF will withdraw 
support based on its prediction of the future value of (1-y), then surely the 
country should anticipate the IMF's actions, and may then wish to deviate one 
period earlier. We may then find, depending on the starting conditions, that 
the whole repeated game may unravel such that the First Best was not 
attainable in the first place. We leave a rigorous analysis of these complex 
issues to further research but note that the decision of whether and when the 
Fund should withdraw support to a country entering into payments' difficulties 
and the effect that that decision and the anticipation of that decision may have 
on a country's policy framework is both a complex and a very real issue.  It is 
one that comes out very clearly indeed from the discussion of the Argentine 
case below. 
 
 4. The current debate on the reform of international financial 
architecture  
 
The simple model outlined above sheds light on some recent discussions 
regarding the reform of the international architecture.  In particular in this 
section, I focus on arguments related to collective action clauses in bonds, 
other issues regarding private sector involvement (PSI) and the possibility of 
establishing a bankruptcy procedure for countries. 
 
Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) perhaps represents the most forcefully argued 
paper in favour of collection action clauses in bond contracts and indeed their 
arguments stem from a simple game, taken from Eichengreen (2000), which is 
similar to the one-shot game presented above.  The essential difference is in 
the assumptions regarding payoffs and in particular, these authors assume that,   18 
in the end, the IMF prefers the ‘Moral Hazard’ to the ‘Worst Case’ outcome.  
They defend this position arguing that if the IMF does not Assist, then the 
ensuing crisis will be so bad for the country and potentially for international 
capital markets, that it is not credible for the IMF to state that they will not 
assist given the IMF has the country’s interest and the stability of international 
financial markets at heart. The equilibrium in their game is then similar to the 
‘Moral Hazard’ outcome in our game above.  Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) 
then argue in favour of reducing the costs of a country declaring default 
through the addition of ‘collective action clauses’ to bond contracts. These 
contracts allow for a more orderly re-negotiation such that a default can be 
resolved more easily and is then presumably less costly for the country. They 
argue that if this change were made then the IMF’s payoffs would change and 
hence the Moral Hazard outcome would no longer be the equilibrium.  Indeed, 
in the context of their model they argue the equivalent of the First Best would 
become the pure strategy equilibrium. 
 
 
Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) assume that the addition of ‘collective action 
clauses’ would imply that the ‘Worst Case’ is not such a bad outcome for the 
IMF. Their optimistic view is then that if the Worst Case outcome is now 
preferred to the Moral Hazard one by the IMF, then the country will chose the 
Safe strategy and hence we get the First Best. However, these are precisely the 
assumptions we have made above which imply that there is no pure strategy 
equilibrium.
15  Moreover, the introduction of collective action clauses may 
change the payoffs such that the country would now prefer the ‘Worst Case’ 
to ‘On Your Own’ i.e.: it might make –E>-A (E<A) in the game above. If this 
is the case, then adding collective action clauses may make the Worst Case the 
only pure strategy equilibrium. To put this another way, if adding collective 
action clauses makes countries prefer to play Risky rather than Safe (assuming 
no IMF assistance), because say, default has now become less costly, then 
neither the IMF nor the private sector will lend. Of course, this simply reflects 
the standard trade-off versus the cost of ex post default and the willingness of 
lenders to advance credit ex ante. 
                                                                 
15 One might interpret the game in Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) as giving the first move to the country. Then, 
if the country knows that a Risky Strategy will be answered by Not Assist from the IMF, the country may 
well prefer to play Safe. However, this sequential play order supposes that the country can commit to its Safe 
strategy. This seems highly unrealistic. The country clearly has an incentive to claim it will play Safe, get 
IMF Assistance and then actually play Risky. The sequential structure offered in this Chapter appears more 
realistic and then, in the one-shot game, the addition of collective action clauses either simply ensures the 
unique mixed strategy equilibrium as depicted above, or, in an extreme case where the cost of default is 




However, the repeated game presented above suggests a new interpretation of 
the potential value of collective active clauses. Suppose that these clauses do 
reduce the cost of default, H, which then reduces E (i.e. they make –E less 
negative or in other words make the Risky strategy for the country, combined 
with Not Assist from the IMF, less painful). This reduces welfare in the Nash 
(mixed strategy) equilibrium (as it reduces the probability of IMF Assistance 
in that equilibrium) and hence increases the amount of ‘punishment’ that the 
IMF can inflict. It therefore makes it more likely that the First Best will be 
attained. In other words, collective action clauses may reduce the threshold 
discount factor required to ensure that the country does not want to deviate.  
 
Roubini (2000), in his comprehensive PSI survey, claims the value of 
collective action clauses may be overdone but does not contemplate the kind 
of repeated game as advanced here. Moreover, Roubini suggests that if the 
IMF can commit to make only limited Assistance then perhaps the country 
will prefer to play Safe and not Risky (C<0 in the game above), so the moral 
hazard problem goes away. And of course the private sector will then Lend, so 
then a modified "First Best" with limited IMF Assistance then may become a 
pure strategy  equilibrium. 
 
In similar vein, Haldane and Krug (2000) have argued that there should be a 
strong presumption of limited IMF and official resources. In their view, the 
problem has been a lack of clarity regarding official policies. They state that 
while some might think of this lack of clarity as ‘constructive ambiguity’, for 
them it has resulted in the assembly of very large packages that have then 
given the wrong signals to the private sector regarding the probability of being 
bailed out.  Moreover, the authors state simply that there is no longer a 
political will for such large packages going forward. 
 
The Haldane and Krug (2000) view might be considered as a criticism of the 
mixed strategy equilibrium in the one shot game analysed - one interpretation 
of which is indeed constructive ambiguity. They argue for a clear statement 
about how much IMF or official money is available and for clearer rules 
regarding how such money may be made available to borrowers. The authors 
also support the idea of a standstill and lending into arrears such that the 
borrowing country can, for a time, cease to service an ‘unsustainable debt’ but   20 
the IMF can continue to Assist assuming that the country has adopted the right 
policy framework (playing Safe). 
 
While I have sympathy for attempting to develop greater clarity for official 
policy, it seems very unlikely, within the context of the one shot game set out 
above, that a clear (credible) commitment from G7 and the IMF that there is 
only so much on the table, and a clear message that the private sector would 
have to have a much larger involvement in crisis resolution, would resolve the 
strategic problem as analysed. Indeed, it seems more likely that such a policy 
would tend to provoke a Run from the private sector making the 'punishment' 
worse than the 'crime'. Further, it would surely aggravate rather than solve the 
co-ordination problem in the private sector.   
 
A possible defence of the Haldane and Krug (2000) view  is to interpret their 
position as wishing to reduce C (the payoff to the country from the Moral 
Hazard outcome) within the context of the repeated game. This then reduces 
the welfare to the country of the Nash (mixed strategy) equilibrium. If this 
could be achieved, all else being equal the First Best is now more likely to be 
attained - in the sense that it will be attained for lower values of the country 
discount factor.  However, this assumes that the limited IMF assistance is 




While the depiction of the private sector is very stylised in the above game, 
the strategic coordination problem within the private sector is a very important 
element of the story.  The model, and the mixed strategy equilibrium, illustrate 
that the IMF is caught between the potential moral hazard if it Assists and a 
private sector Run if it withdraws then making the 'punishment' worse than the 
'crime'.  This raises the question as to whether there are other devices to ensure 
lender coordination that would then make IMF withdrawal less costly for the 
country possibly altering the game above. Indeed, this is perhaps the strongest 
argument in favour of private sector contingency lines. Gavin and Powell 
(2000) suggested that a private sector contingent credit line can be seen 
exactly as a co-ordinating device within private sector creditors and hence 
                                                                 
16 One view is that in the face of a liquidity run partial help is pointless in that unless the assistance is 
complete, the ‘Run’ from the private sector will not be halted. Either the promise of liquidity provision is 
complete, through a very large package, or not. Roubini (2000) suggests however that in a game with multiple 
equilibria, then there may be a role for partial assistance in order to influence equilibrium selection.  
   21 
might well play such a role
17.  However, in practice such lines are likely to 
remain relatively small.  In the case of Argentina a contingent line stood at 
less than $5bn at the time of its use, and though while successfully used, could 
only be thought of as coordination between a rather small subset of lenders. 
 
Standstills can also be thought of as another type of coordinating device. 
Contingent credit lines might be thought of as ex ante coordination by lenders 
(i.e. before any contractual default had been declared), whereas standstills are 
a type of ex post coordination. As analysed by Gay et al (2001) they may 
indeed have a useful role to play in terms of crisis resolution. However, as 
noted by Roubini (2000), the existence of an explicit standstill policy may 
provoke the ‘run’ ex ante. The combination of a more comprehensive 
contingent credit line ex ante and an explicit standstill policy ex post may be a 
superior alternative.  
 
Indeed, while the introduction of collective action clauses, and a clearer 
message regarding the (limited) funds available from the IMF and other 
lenders, may make the First Best more likely to be attained and the use of 
creditor coordination devices might alleviate to some extent the problems of 
the private sector 'run', as illustrated in the repeated game model presented in 
this paper, the repeated game model also highlights a fundamental problem 
which none of these particular advances in architecture are likely to solve. 
That problem is that if a country is in the unfortunate position that its 
fundamentals are deteriorating such that default is becoming more and more 
likely, then at some point it is likely to have the incentives to deviate to Risky 
play and hence the IMF will be forced to respond with the mixed strategy. The 
problem that at some point deviation is likely to occur before default appears 
to require deeper changes in institutions.  
 
Indeed, this more fundamental problem provides an interesting defence for the 
rekindled interest in the idea of a bankruptcy procedure for countries.  Anne 
Krueger has recently explicitly proposed such a policy. Suppose that  we start 
in the First Best of the repeated game. Krueger argues that it must be the 
country that is to decide whether it enters into a bankruptcy procedure or not. 
A bankruptcy procedure might then be thought of as an additional action 
                                                                 
17 Some doubt that private institutions would actually satisfy their contractual obligations in times of stress 
while others have suggested that private banks may hedge their exposures such that liquidity is not actually 
increased at the time the facility is used.  The successful triggering of the Argentine facility in August 2001, 
in conjunction with an IMF package, when the country had no access to other private credit, may now serve to 
dilute some of these criticisms.  However this limited line could not prevent the subsequent run, default and 
devaluation driven by more fundamental concerns.   22 
available to the country. The payoff to the country in the bankruptcy 
procedure would, on the one hand reflect the degree of protection from 
creditors afforded to the country, while on the other hand the country would 
no doubt suffer from the stigma that entering such a procedure would elicit 
and  would suffer from additional controls and monitoring that such a 
procedure might entail. Let us assume that this payoff is then under the control 
of the international community and could be managed as a function of the 
probability of default. 
 
As the probability of default  increased the bankruptcy procedure could be 
designed to become relatively more attractive to the country such that, at the 
point where the probability of default in the Risky/Non-Assist outcome hits its 
threshold value, choosing the bankruptcy procedure would be slightly more 
attractive for the country than deviating to the Risky strategy. A bankruptcy 
procedure designed in that fashion might then keep the country playing Safe 
until the point at which the procedure was chosen. This line of argument might  
be used to place a lower and an upper bound on the attractiveness how 
generous or painful the bankruptcy procedure should be for the country.  Note 
that the payoff to the country from the First Best is zero such that at the point 
where the country prefers to play Risky, the payoff from deviating is just 
above zero. At the point, where otherwise the country would deviate, the 
bankruptcy procedure must also give a payoff of just slightly above zero.  It 
goes without saying though that, until that point, choosing default should 
never be more attractive than continuing with the First Best i.e.: it should 
attract a payoff of  less than zero
18. 
 
Now, compared to the case considered above, where a country is almost 
certain to deviate before default is called it is not obvious that introducing a 
bankruptcy procedure is worse for the private sector. As suggested by 
Krueger, the bankruptcy procedure is a type of coordination device. In the 
absence of such a procedure, the prediction of the model above is that a 
country will deviate to Risky play before it defaults, the IMF will respond 
with play consistent with the non-cooperative mixed strategy equilibrium and 
at some point IMF Assistance will be withdrawn and the private sector will 
Run. While some lucky private creditors may get out in time, as the Run itself  
is very harmful to the country, the ex ante prospects for private investors - 
                                                                 
18 It is assumed here that  the country cannot deviate to Risky play and then opt for the bankruptcy procedure.  
This implies that while the country is the one that asks for the procedure to be implemented there must be a 
decision making body (the IMF or another) that decides whether the procedure is appropriate or not and one 
of the criteria for that decision must be whether the country has maintained appropriate (Safe) policies.   23 
who in general will not know whether they will get out in time or not – may 
actually be better with the bankruptcy procedure in place . With a bankruptcy 
procedure designed according to the ideas here, the country would chose the 
procedure before it deviates to Risky play and before the withdrawal of IMF 
Assistance. From the standpoint of the private sector whether this is better or 
not will depend on a trade-off, between, on the one hand, the probability of 
getting out in time (in the absence of the procedure during the ‘Run’) and the 
haircut applied to the wider set of investors caught in the bankruptcy 
procedure. The latter may turn out to be better for the private sector and hence 
the argument that the private sector may reduce the amount of credit to a 
country if such a procedure is introduced loses much of its force. 
 
Note also that, for the IMF, if the country deviates to Risky play this is a 
highly negative outcome.  In the First Best the IMF obtains a payoff of zero 
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clearly negative.  This suggests that the international community should also 
be willing to invest something in  the bankruptcy procedure. As discussed 
above, such a procedure would have to afford the country a payoff slightly 
higher than zero at the point where the country would otherwise deviate.  
Given that if the country does deviate then this is a bad outcome for the IMF, 
there should be some resources that the IMF would be willing to make 
available to the country to provide the right incentives to chose bankruptcy 
over deviation in those rare and unfortunate circumstances. 
 
5. On the case of Argentina 
 
The recent Argentina crisis backs up well both the assumptions and the 
predictions of the model discussed above. It also helps provide an interesting, 
if very painful, illustration of the current deficiencies in the ‘international 
financial architecture’. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the 
history of the Argentine crisis. In Box 1, I present, in highly schematic form, 
three  mutually reinforcing hypotheses regarding the roots of the crisis. Suffice 
to say in my view the crisis was a result of a fairly complex set of factors 
including bad luck, a required adjustment of the current account which due to 
domestic inflexibility provoked recession but which was largely completed 
through 2000, a required but modest fiscal adjustment that was not achieved, 
and very bad politics - see Powell (2002). This account contrasts with that of  
Mussa (this volume) that  emphasises the fiscal dimension. My intention here 
is to focus instead on the game between the IMF, the country and the private   24 
sector as Argentina entered into payments problems as an illustration of the 








































1.  Fiscal and debt sustainability 
Argentine debt reached 46% of GDP by the end of 2000, not large by European standards but some argued too 
much for an emerging country of Argentina’s characteristics. Fiscal irresponsibility is the explanation favoured 
by Michael Mussa in this volume. However risk spreads on Argentine bonds were about 670bpts in mid 
February 2001 reflecting an average market view, that there was some risk of default but not certainty.  Wall 
Street economists were clearly divided.  JP Morgan in September 2000 suggested the debt story was, ‘Much to 
do about not so much’.  Lehmann brothers suggested the situation was unsustainable
*. 
2.  Competitiveness, external shocks, the exchange rate, inflexibility and the sustainability of the current account 
The debt position was more clearly unsustainable if Argentina could not grow. Recession started in the third 
quarter 1998 (although there was growth in late 1999). Through 1998, Argentina suffered from a fall in the terms 
of trade, the rise in the US dollar and the fall-out in emerging market risk spreads after the Russian default 
(increasing interest payments to external debt holders), and in January 1999, the Brazilian devaluation. With a 
fixed exchange rate and inflexible formal labour markets, one view was that Argentina could only adjust through 
recession and deflation. On the other hand, exports grew every year during Convertibility except 1999 after the 
devaluation of the Real, albeit from a small base. A broader question was whether the current account was 
sustainable. Foreign direct investment remained buoyant, private sector foreign assets had grown to over $100bn 
and returns on those assets could have resulted in substantial inflows if repatriated, and during 2000 an 
increasing amount of debt, issued abroad in foreign currency, was transferred to domestic pension funds and 
banks.  In Powell (2002) I argue that although the trade balance needed to adjust through 1999, by the end of 
2000 this adjustment was near complete.  On this view the current account was not so far from sustainability as 
to explain what was to follow. 
3.  Political Risk 
Argentine politics has been extremely messy, and this severely affected economic management from 1998. Ex-
President Menem’s power waned during his second term leading to a period of very factious politics.  The 1999 
election campaign saw President Duhalde suggesting that the external debt should be renegotiated and ex 
Minister Cavallo, an architect of the currency board, apparently suggesting that the peso could float. The 
"Alianza" government of ex President de la Rúa was perceived as weak in part because of the weak nature of the 
alliance and the fact that it lacked an outright majority in Congress.  Fights within the alliance and political 
scandal dogged 2000, culminating in the resignation of the Vice-President towards the end of the year.  January 
to April, 2001 saw three different Economy Ministers with Lopez Murphy being ousted after a political storm 
created by his proposed fiscal adjustment package. Political scandal remained and an acrimonious battle between 
then Minister Cavallo and Central Bank President, Pedro Pou, led finally to the latter’s ousting.  This, plus 
Cavallo’s idea to include the Euro in the currency board basket (arguably a political rather than an economic 
event), sent country risk soaring.  The interaction between the electoral system, the structure of political parties 
and the federal nature of the country made for continuous divisions within and between parties, and between the 
federal and provincial governments and arguably contributed to a high cost of government, little incentives to 
improve the quality of public services (lack of accountability), possible corruption and difficulties in maintaining 
fiscal discipline. - see Calvo and Abal Medina (2001).                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
* See “Argentina’s Debt Dynamics: Much ado about not so much”; JP Morgan Market Brief 6/9/00 and Lehman Brothers “Global Weekly 
Economic Monitor”, 2/3/01 section entitled, “Argentina: Speaking the Unspeakable”. 
** Powell (2002) conducts a Vector Autoregression (VAR) econometric analysis and finds support for the view (a) that these hypotheses 
were mutually reinforcing and (b) that there were multiple equilibria.  In particular higher risk spreads fed through to lower bank deposits, 
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In December 2000, Argentina obtained a very significant support package 
from the IMF and from a set of private sector creditors. This package was 
known as the "blindaje" and was essentially seen as a stand-by to protect 
against possible exclusion from capital markets to create confidence. (Blindaje 
implies armour plating  or defensive protection against an attack.) The 
authorities claimed that the total package stood at close to $40bn.  With the 
blindaje in place, country risk fell to around 700 basis points over US 
Treasuries.  This level of country risk reflected ‘average market opinion’, that 
the risk of default was significant but clearly less than unity. It is a maintained 
hypothesis of the discussion to follow that (a) default and devaluation were 
not inevitable at this stage and that (b) this agreement represented a 
'cooperative' First Best, in terms of the repeated model, where Argentina had 
agreed to a set of Safe policies and the IMF was Assisting
19. 
 
However, even with the blindaje in place, the real economy did not appear to 
improve and, if anything, deteriorated in the first quarter of 2001. Moreover, 
there was continued political squabbling within the governing alliance in part 
regarding the promises made to the IMF.  This resulted in the March 2001 
resignation of Economy Minister Luis Machinea and then, only a few days 
later, of his replacement Ricardo López Murphy who was himself replaced by 
Domingo Cavallo after only a very short term in office. Announced policy 
oscillated wildly from the orthodox fiscal rectitude of López Murphy to the  
heterodoxy of Cavallo. Cavallo’s policies included the introduction of the euro 
into the currency basket against which the peso was pegged, subsidies to 
particular industries and a relaxation of banking regulations. The resultant 
uncertainty was heightened by the eventual departure of Central Bank 
President, Pedro Pou after a ‘political inquiry’that  was widely regarded as 
undermining the Central Bank’s legal  independence. Country-risk soared to 
over 1000 basis points over US Treasuries. 
 
The decision of President de la Rúa not to support the López Murphy fiscal 
adjustment package may be seen as having marked  the political limit to fiscal 
adjustment through cutting nominal expenditure. In my opinion, a relatively 
modest fiscal adjustment may well  have sufficed to restore  confidence at that 
time.  
 
                                                                 
19 An alternative interpretation of the risk spreads is of course that default was already deemed inevitable but 
that the Fund or others would bail-out international investors.   I disagree with this interpretation although 
opinion was, of course, mixed – see Box 1.   27 
However, in the language of the repeated game outlined above, the country 
had reached its limit with respect to "Safe" policies. With the $40bn IMF-
sponsored  blindaje in place, but the real economy still not responding and 
default probabilities rising, the incentives were in place to deviate to a more 
Risky strategy - to attempt to ‘get the economy moving’. This Risky strategy 
consisted of relaxing banking regulations, the introduction of subsidies aimed 
at particular sectors of the economy, the proposal to include the euro into the 
currency board peg and the subsequent introduction of a de facto dual 
exchange rate through a set of subsidies and tariffs based on the dollar/euro 
exchange rate. 
 
With country risk soaring to over 1000 basis points in April, the IMF also had 
a decision to make. The choice was between support for Argentina by strongly 
restating its commitment to the blindaje and essentially saying that the private 
markets was wrong, or, withdrawal on the basis that it disagreed with the 
sacking of López Murphy and the subsequent change in course in Argentina's 
economic policy. In fact the IMF did neither. The perception from Buenos 
Aires was that the IMF vacillated. 
 
It is clear that, with the country having deviated to Risky play, the IMF was 
caught precisely as represented in the payoffs to the non-cooperative, one-shot 
game discussed above. On the one hand, the IMF was surely uneasy 
continuing to support a country following a set of policies that the Fund did 
not support - see Mussa (this volume). On the other hand, the Fund was most 
definitely aware that if it withdrew support then this might very well provoke 
a private sector run and almost certain default and devaluation. As represented 
in the one-shot game, there is no pure strategy equilibrium to this game and, 
with no cooperative solution available, vacillation was indeed the equilibrium 
response! 
 
The game above also contains a highly stylistic interaction between the 
decisions of the IMF and the private sector. This suggested interaction is 
amply backed up by the Argentine case.  In Buenos Aires, each new policy 
announcement was analysed in detail from the standpoint of whether this 
would, finally, create a rupture with the IMF or whether the IMF would 
continue to support. The importance of this cannot be overstated as a common 
view at the time was that if the IMF withdrew, then this would create the 
conditions for a run on the banks and hence that source of financing for the 
government would be eliminated.  
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The announcement of the de facto dual exchange rate regime in July 2001 
was, for many, the final straw that could have provoked the withdrawal of the 
IMF. If the IMF had indeed interpreted the measure as a dual exchange rate 
then it might have been very difficult to maintain support - see Mussa (this 
volume). As it turned out, the Argentine authorities argued successfully that it 
was not a dual exchange rate, as the policy operated through export subsidies 
and import tariffs but the speculation regarding the withdrawal of the Fund 
was enough to create the conditions for a run on the banks in July and August. 
 
This bank run was very clearly arrested by the final IMF package signed in 
August 2001. This package came as a surprise to many.  In the spirit of the 
repeated game above it simply reflected the IMF's mixed strategy play. The 
sequence of speculation regarding IMF withdrawal, bank run and then IMF 
Assistance and the bank run being stopped backs up very clearly indeed the 
stylised assumptions regarding the dependence of private sector decisions on 
IMF action in the model and the 'coordinating' role of the IMF. Finally the 
Fund did indeed withdraw support and that withdrawal did indeed help to 
create the conditions for a final major run on the banks of November 2001.  
This run sparked the banking controls that helped to bring down the de la Rúa 
government and subsequent default and devaluation. 
 
It can be argued that a ‘game’ between the IMF and Argentina, similar to that 
depicted above, continues today (May 2002). Indeed, at the time of writing the 
Argentine authorities are actively seeking assistance from the IMF and other 
multilaterals. Presidents Bush and Aznar and other world leaders have asked 
Argentina to present a ‘sustainable plan’ indicating implicitly that (only) if 
such a plan were forthcoming from Buenos Aires would international 
assistance become available. President Duhalde’s reply was that in his opinion 
only with international assistance, would a plan from Buenos Aires be 
sustainable. President Duhalde’s remark is no doubt based on the view that the 
private sector will fail to have confidence and invest unless an agreement with 
the IMF is in place. However, if international assistance is given up-front, then 
the IMF most likely calculates that Argentine politicians will have reduced 
incentives to carry through the required reforms. 
 
In other words, with Assistance comes Moral Hazard but if no Assistance is 
forthcoming, the Argentine government believes that it is impossible to stop 
the private sector from running further. The authorities are then caught 
between the negative effects of the banking sector controls and the fear that 
lifting them, with no IMF agreement in place, might create a run on the   29 
currency and very significant monetary instability. The continuing lack of a 
pure-strategy equilibrium is then still evident.  Moreover, now that Assistance 
has been withdrawn and the 'punishment' of the mixed strategy has been 
dissipated, it appears very difficult indeed to regain the cooperative First Best 
outcome. Unfortunately, Argentina may have to resolve this crisis on its own, 
such that it has something to lose to make the removal of IMF support a 
tangible punishment before the First Best is once again supported. 
 
What might have been different if a bankruptcy procedure for countries had 
existed?  Following the arguments above, for such a procedure to be effective, 
the country should have preferred that alternative rather than deviating to the 
Risky strategy in the first half of 2001. If this route had been taken, then the 
bank runs of July and November, and the build up of public sector debt within 
the domestic banking system that occurred during 2001, might have been 
avoided.  Arguably, more Argentine debt might have remained with foreigners 
(who effectively transferred debt to Argentine residents through 2001) and it 
is possible that a default might have then created more contagion. However, 
the debt would have been widely held and it is unlikely that this would have 
been a serious problem. The main point is that domestic institutions would 
have been stronger at the time of default the new economic direction of the 
country could have been developed from a much stronger position. As it 
happened, the weakening of the banking system through 2001, the banking 
system runs the banking controls, and the asymmetric pesification created 
large re-distributions and losses which remain to date the source of 
considerable friction and are preventing a final resolution of the crisis.  It does 
seem that a more managed process would have been highly beneficial in 








In this chapter I have focussed on the role of the IMF in countries facing 
international payment’s difficulties. I have suggested that the two main 
opposing schools of thought on this role; namely the moral hazard school and 
the liquidity school are both correct and moreover that they are both correct 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, this implies – and this is the main argument of 
the chapter - that the role of the Fund is an extremely difficult one, as a one   30 
shot game between the Fund, the country and the private sector appears to 
have no pure strategy equilibrium. The Fund cannot give unconditional 
support without generating moral hazard but if it does not give support the 
coordination problem within the private sector may lead to a ‘run’ and a 
liquidity crisis (on top of any fundamental problems). The only Nash 
equilibrium in a one shot game is with the Fund hedging its bets by 
unpredictably giving support and the country then, only with some probability, 
adopting a “Safe” policy. 
 
However, in a repeated game framework, it may be possible for cooperation to 
develop. In particular the IMF can offer the First Best (where the IMF Assists, 
the country plays Safe and the private sector Lends), but threaten that if the 
country deviates to Risky play then the result will be the Nash (mixed 
strategy) equilibrium thereafter. Under this view, a country should not deviate 
unless the country’s discount factor is too low. 
 
In a discussion linking the results of this simple game to the recent discussions 
on PSI a number of conclusions emerge. First, there is a view currently that 
multilateral funds, for bailouts, should be strictly limited. On the one hand, 
this runs the risk of creating the conditions for a private sector Run. However, 
the policy might be rationalised in the repeated game version of the game as 
this may reduce the welfare of the country in the Nash (mixed strategy 
equilibrium) and hence allows the IMF to inflict greater punishment and hence 
create a greater chance of the First Best being supported. 
 
It is also argued that in the one shot game, introducing collective action 
clauses in bond contracts may simply ensure that the only equilibrium is the 
mixed strategy one or, if default if made much less costly, may even imply 
that the Worst Case (of no IMF Assistance, Risky country play and the private 
sector running) becomes a pure strategy equilibrium.  However, interestingly 
collective action clauses may be rationalised in the repeated game framework. 
Surprisingly perhaps, if we assume that the introduction of such clauses 
reduces the pain of countries from playing Risky and the IMF not Assisting 
(the outcome where default is most likely), then this reduces the (ex ante) 
welfare of the country in the Nash (mixed strategy) equilibrium and hence 
allows the IMF to impose greater punishment. Hence there is again a greater 
chance of the First Best being supported. 
 
However, a close analysis of the repeated game shows that as the probability 
of default rises at some point the country will have the incentive to deviate to   31 
Risky play.  This implies that countries will generally deviate before they 
default.  This problem will not, it seems, be solved by attempting to make 
international assistance more rule bound or by introducing collective action 
clauses. 
 
However, the introduction of a bankruptcy procedure as a new potential action 
for the country, that is slightly preferred by the country than deviation to the 
Risky strategy, just at the point where otherwise the country would deviate, 
might provide the best potential solution to this problem. The bankruptcy 
procedure should not, of course, otherwise be more attractive for the country 
than the First Best. This approach may yield some bounds to the attractiveness 
or pain that such a bankruptcy procedure should entail for an unfortunate 
country in such a desperate position. 
 
A review of the role of the IMF in Argentina serves to illustrate many of these 
issues. While, the chapter remains agnostic with respect to the causes of the 
current crisis, there was clearly a failure to find an orderly solution to 
Argentina’s external debt problem. While this has not appeared to create 
significant international financial contagion, it has led to a very severe crisis in 
Argentina and led to a set of questions regarding the role of the IMF. 
 
The interpretation offered here is that at the start of 2001, default was not 
inevitable. Indeed, let us assume that Argentina was trying to implement Safe 
policies at the time and the Fund was assisting consistent with the First Best. 
However, having secured IMF Assistance at the end of 2000, Argentina 
adopted a set of more Risky policies to the displeasure of the Fund  - largely in 
an attempt to get the economy moving.  Around May 2001, country risk had 
risen ton 1000 basis points and the IMF had a decision to make: support the 
country strongly implicitly saying that the markets were wrong or withdraw.  
The perception from Buenos Aires was that the Fund vacillated. The IMF was 
caught between continuing support for a country adopting a set of policies it 
became increasingly uncomfortable with (moral hazard) and the knowledge 
that if it withdrew support then it would provoke a Run from the private sector 
that would most certainly herald the default that Argentina was trying to 
avoid.  This is precisely the structure of payoffs in the (one shot) model 
presented and the equilibrium play is then in mixed strategies – vacillation. 
The Fund finally did withdraw its support, and that most certainly was an 
important factor in triggering the run from the banking sector and from 
Argentine bonds pushing country risk from levels of around 1400 basis points 
to over 3000 in November 2001.   32 
 
While the Argentine crisis was most certainly home bred deriving from a 
mixture of bad luck (negative shocks), required adjustment of the current 
account and the fiscal accounts and bad politics, the crisis also serves to show 
the dilemma facing the IMF in these situations. Criticisms of the particular 
policies of the various decision-makers in the IMF at the time appear to miss 
the point. More importantly, there is a need to analyse more carefully the 
nature of the underlying game. As discussed extensively above, the interaction 
of moral hazard plus the severe private sector coordination problem makes the 
role of the IMF an extremely delicate one. 
 
Unfortunately, the one shot game appears to be one with no pure strategy 
equilibrium and a cooperative solution to the repeated game is likely to break 
down as default approaches - at least given the current institutional 
arrangements and standard financial contracts.  Some creative thinking is 
required to give countries in such unfortunate situations an alternative that 
does not constitute a ‘bail out’ for private sector creditors, that protects 
countries from the excesses of liquidity type ‘runs’ and that gives, as far as 
possible, incentives for countries to maintain safer policies that will ensure a 
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